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Tort Immunity Revisited: What is the Present Test for
Statutory Employer?
JaniceM. Church*

The Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1061, defines the statutory employer as a principal who has contracted others
to perform work "which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation."' A
principal meeting the statutory employer test shall be liable for workmen's
compensation benefits to the contractor's injured employees.2 Due to the
exclusivity of the compensation remedy, the statutory employer enjoys the same
tort immunity that actual employers enjoy under Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032.'
In 1986, the supreme court restricted tort immunity by defining a three-tiered
test for statutory employer known as the Berry test.4 Three years later, the
legislature rejected the Berry test by amending Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1061. 5 The question on every tort practitioner's mind, given the 1989
amendment, is what must be shown to prove statutory employment.

Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Special Counsel for the Baton Rouge Firm of Bell, Cooper & Hyman. Juris Doctorate
degree from the University of Illinois College of Law, graduating Order of the Coif and serving as
Administrative Editor of the Law Review.
1. La. R.S. 23:1061 (Supp. 1993). The statute in pertinent part provides:
Where any person ... undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade,
business, or occupation ... for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or
any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to
any employee employed in the execution of the work or to his dependent, any
compensation under this Chapter which he would have been liable to pay if the employee
had been immediately employed by him ....
2. Id. This secondary source of workmen's compensation coverage prevents principals acting
as employers from evading workmen's compensation liability through use of an intermediary
contractor. Williams v. Shell Oil, 677 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.
Ct. 570 (1982). "To this end, coverage has been liberally construed." Id.
3. See 1976 La. Acts No. 147, § 1. The 1976 Amendment to La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1993)
was essentially acodification of the Louisiana Supreme Court's earlier decision in Thibodeaux v. Sun
Oil Co., 49 So. 2d 852 (La. 1950).
4. Berry v. Holston Well Serv., 488 So. 2d 934, 937-38 (La. 1986). The "two-contract" defense
for statutory employer immunity is not a question addressed in the instant article and was not dealt
with in Berry. The two-contract statutory employment defense contemplates relationships among at
least three entities: a general contractor who has been hired by a third party to perform a specific
task, a subcontractor hired by that general contractor, and an employee of that subcontractor. For
recent cases on this aspect of statutory employment, see Duncan v. Balcor Property Management,
Inc., 615 So. 2d 985 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writdenied, 617 So. 2d 936 (1993); Freeman v. Moss Well
Serv., Inc., 614 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 618 So. 2d 413 (1993).
5. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3. See also H. Alston Johnson, Developments in the Law:
Worker's Compensation, 50 La. L. Rev. 391, 397 (1989) (maintaining the amendment was passed
to reject or severely limit Berry).
*
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THE BERRY TEST

6
In 1986, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Berry v. Holston Well Service
interpreted Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061 as requiring a three-tiered method
of analysis for determining statutory employment. Under the Berry test, the first
level of inquiry involved a determination of whether the scope of the work was
specialized or nonspecialized.7 In making this determination, the courts were
to consider "whether the contract work requires a degree of skill, training,
experience, education and/or equipment not normally possessed by those outside
the contract field." 8 If the contract work was considered specialized, the inquiry
ended and the principal was not a statutory employer.9
If the contract work was found nonspecialized, the Berry test required a
second level of inquiry comparing the nature of the principal's trade, business,
or occupation with the contract work.'0 Berry's second tier involved an
evaluation of three factors:

(1) Whether the contract was routine, customary, regular, and predictable, rather than one that required nonrecurring or extraordinary
constructions and repairs;
(2) Whether the principal had the equipment and manpower capable of
performing the contract work (i.e., contract work was handled ordinarily
through the principal's employees); and
(3) Whether the practice in the industry was to contract out this type
of work, rather than have the principal's own employees do the
work. "
Routine, customary, and predictable work that a principal customarily did not
contract out and was capable of doing with his own manpower and equipment
were facts supporting statutory employment; while nonrecurring, extraordinary
work customarily contracted out in the industry because the principal lacked the
capability of doing the work were facts defeating statutory employment. If this
balancing of multiple factors indicated facts supporting statutory employment,
then the court was to proceed to the third tier.
The third tier of Berry required a court to determine if the principal was
engaged in the work at the time of the alleged accident. "In order for any person
to come within the scope of the statute, he must be engaged in the enterprise at
the time of the injury."' 2

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986).
Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938-39.
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In sum, parts one and three of the Berry test are potentially determinative
of the statutory employer status.13 If the work was specialized per se, or if the
defendant was not actually engaged in the relevant type of work at the time of
the accident, the defendant was not a statutory employer, whereas part two was
a multi-factored, fact-based analysis. Berry's rigid tiered approach, requiring the
principal to clear all three hurdles (nick-named the "triple play"), was short
lived."'

II. THE 1989 AMENDMENT
In 1989, the Louisiana Legislature added the following language to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061:
The fact that work is specialized or non-specialized, is extraordinary
construction or simple maintenance, is work that is usually done by
contract or by the principal's direct employee, or is routine or unpredictable, shall not prevent the work undertaken by the principal from being
considered part of the principal's trade, business or occupation,
regardless of whether the principal has the equipment or manpower
capable of performing the work. 5
In other words, considerations that the work is:
1.
2.
3.
4.

specialized or nonspecialized;
extraordinary construction or simple maintenance;
usually done by contract or by the principal's direct employee; or
routine or unpredictable;

do not ipso facto "prevent the work undertaken by the principal
from being
'6
considered part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation."'
In reality, the legislature amended the wrong statute. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1032 addresses the employer's tort immunity, whereas section 1061
addresses liability for workmen's compensation benefits.
However, the
legislature intended something by its actions. This article examines how the
courts should decide statutory employer cases, given the amendment as enacted.
To begin with, many questions are raised by the amendment's choice of
words. Did the amendment simply mean that the Berry factors apply, but that
no one factor could be singly determinative of statutory employer status? Are
our courts to return to the pre-Berry "integral part" test? Are our courts to
reevaluate the pre-Berryjurisprudence in fashioning a test less rigid than Berry?

13.
at 37,
14.
15.
16.

Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, Il,Workers' Compensation Law andPractice§ 364,
in 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. Supp. 1992).
Id. at 35-36.
1989 La. Acts No. 454.
La. R.S. 23:1061 (Supp. 1993).
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The legislature never addressed these specific questions, but apparently intended
"to try and bring the law back to its posture before the Berry decision was
made.""7 Accordingly, analysis of the plain language of the statutory amendment and the applicable pre-Berryjurisprudence are necessary in formulating the
appropriate post-amendment analysis.
In reality, the 1989 amendment's language failed to expressly state any new
statutory employer test, nor did the amendment expressly state that the legislature
was adopting or returning to the "integral part" test, also called the essential to
business test, handed down by the Louisiana Supreme Court long before
Berry.'8 The only certainty which can be gleaned from the amendment's
language was the legislature's intent to eliminate the tiered nature of the Berry
test. The legislature's failure to affirmatively state what test should govern in
lieu of Berry is now a common issue in Louisiana courts.' 9
III.

THE AMBIGUOUS OR UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE AMENDMENT

By failing to set forth its own test within the confines of the 1989
amendment, the legislature opened the door for the trial and appellate courts to
once again determine, until the supreme court speaks, what type of evidence and
pertinent facts now define whether work is within the alleged principal's trade,
business, or occupation. Given the demise of Berry and the absence of any
Louisiana Supreme Court decision interpreting the 1989 amendment, the courts
must examine both the statute itself and the pre-Berryjurisprudence interpreting
the statute to determine the appropriate test.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061 defines statutory employer as a principal
contracting out work "which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation. ' 0
Years before Berry, the supreme court held that this language required a court
to determine conclusively from the evidence of record whether the services
performed by the plaintiff were part of the principal's trade, business, or
occupation. 2 1 For example, if the plaintiff was a cement finisher doing cement
finishing work on the alleged principal's premises on the date of the accident, the
defendant had to prove his trade, business, and occupation was cement

17. House Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations, May 26, 1989, at 16, discussion of
House Bill No. 1431.
18. See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Sun Oil Co., 40 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949), afftd, 49 So.
2d 852 (La. 1950). See, e.g., Stansbury v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 91 So. 2d 917, 919 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957) (calling test "essential" to business).
19. In the first circuit alone, there are writs pending in State v. C.F. Indus., No. 93-CW-1100 (lst
Cir. 1993, writ application pending); Picard v. Zeit Exploration, No. 92-CW-1950 (lst Cir. 1993)
(writ pending; oral argument heard November 4, 1993).
20. La. R.S. 23:1061 (Supp. 1993).
21. Duvalle v. Lake Kenilworth, Inc., 396 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (La. 1981).
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finishing.22 Thus, defendants could not escape liability pre-Berry merely by
their conclusory assertions that the work was within their business.2
Instead, the nature of the statutory employer inquiry was always grounded
in fact, as determined by the circumstances of the particular case.24 The factual
nature of this inquiry required many reversals over the years because district
courts often granted statutory employer motions too hastily. Any present day
test that fails to include a factual inquiry would mean the courts were shifting the
statutory employer defense to pure legal analysis, rather than the issue of fact it
has always been.
The 1989 amendment reaffirmed that a factual inquiry was pertinent by
identifying four different factual considerations, none of which control the
outcome of a case as they did under Berry. The amendment's plain language
that this factor, this factor, this factor "or" this factor "shall not prevent the work
undertaken by the principal from being considered part of the principal's trade"
means under any dictionary reading that no single factor, listed here in the
disjunctive, shall prevent, hinder, or impede the court from considering the work
as within the principal's business.2 6 In essence, the amendment "does not ...
mean that these [Berry] factors are not to be considered; rather it appears to
mean that no single factor (such as specialized versus nonspecialized work) may
be used to defeat the defense of immunity raised by the principal. 27 Rather,

22. Doty v. Union Pacific R.R., 613 So. 2d 1094, 1096-97 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 619
So. 2d 547 (1993) (pre-amendment accident applying the supreme court's earlier test in Lewis v.
Exxon Corp., 441 So. 2d 192, 197-98 (La. 1983)). See also Freeman v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d
201, 206 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding Chevron's business is producing and refining oil and gas, not
plaintiff's business of installing pollution control sewerage systems).
23. Freeman, 517 F.2d at 201; Lewis, 441 So. 2d at 192; Thompson v. South Central Bell Tel.
Co., 411 So. 2d 26 (La. 1982).
24. Freeman, 517 F.2d at 209; Rowe v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 226, 228 (La.
1985); Lewis, 441 So. 2d at 196; Barnes v. Sun Oil Co., 362 So. 2d 761, 763 (La. 1978); Lushute
v. Diesi, 354 So. 2d 179, 183 (La. 1977).
25. See, e.g., Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1991) (issue of fact whether
services were within principal's business); Williams v. Shell Oil Co., 677 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 570 (1982) (issue of fact whether repairing cooling tower was
part of principal's business); Duvalle, 396 So. 2d at 1269 (issue of fact whether pest control services
were part of apartment complex owner's business); Berry v. Brown & Root, Inc., 595 So. 2d 767 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1992) (issue of fact whether electrical and instrumental work to refinery met test);
Carter v. Chevron Chemical Co., 593 So. 2d 942, 946 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 596 So. 2d
211 (1992) (issue of fact whether operation of load lugger and clinker hopper was within principal's
trade and business); Fountain v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 578 So. 2d 236, 239 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 581 So. 2d 707 (1991) (electric lineman not part of business because company had
policy of contracting out type and magnitude of work involved); Seamster v. Kerr-McGee Refinery
Corp.; 488 So. 2d 1139, 1142-43 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (issue of fact whether painting of refinery
processing unit was part of business of crude oil processing plant).
26. The author referred to The American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed.) at 873 for "or" (a
disjunctive term suggesting alternatives; a singular usage when all elements in a series connected by
"or" are singular); and at 982 "prevent" (adjective; hinder, impede, avert).
27. Johnson, supra note 5, at 397.
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the legislature intended to reject the rigorous tiered analysis set forth in Berry
where factors like the specialization of the work (i.e., the first step) could be
determinative of the entire inquiry without any further factual consideration.
The amendment's rejection of the Berry tiered approach, therefore, does not
necessarily indicate a rejection of the type of factual evidence considered by the
Berry court. To the contrary, the amendment's listing of four factual considerations demands that a fact-based inquiry be conducted in cases after the
amendment."
IV.

THE JURISPRUDENCE SHAPING TODAY'S STATUTORY EMPLOYER TEST

In undertaking the appropriate post-amendment factual analysis, pre-Berry
decisions illuminate which facts should or should not constitute statutory
employment. For instance, the facts that a contract exists between the principal
and the independent contractor and that the plaintiff was injured on its premises
were never enough for the principal to make a showing.29 The same is true
post-amendment. The mere existence of a contractual relationship does not mean
the contractor's employees' work is done pursuant to such contract. If that were
the case, the principal could always shield himself from liability by calling all
the contractor's employees statutory employees. Such an interpretation would
render the statute's trade, business, or occupation language superfluous.
Accordingly, the existence of the contract is never determinative of the question,
but merely establishes the relationship between the principal and the contractor. 30 Courts must look beyond the contract to additional facts when resolving
statutory employment.
The jurisprudence has forged several guidelines defining which facts indicate
whether work is within the principal's trade, business, or occupation.3 An
examination of pre-Berrycases shows that the movant requesting immunity was
required to prove that:
a. the job being done was customarily or regularly32 performed by the
alleged principal itself through its own employees;

28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Williams v. Gervais F. Favrot Co., 499 So. 2d 623, 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986),
writ denied, 503 So. 2d 19 (1987).
30. Id.
31. See Berry v. Holston Well Serv., Inc., 488 So. 2d 934, 938 (La. 1986) ("The jurisprudence
has forged several guidelines, in no way exhaustive, which can aid a court in resolving th[el factual
issue [of what work is considered part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation] .... ").
32. Williams v. Shell Oil Co., 677 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.
Ct. 570 (1982); Barrios v. Engine & Gas Compressor Serv., Inc., 669 F.2d 350, 354-55 (5th Cir.
1982); Freeman v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1975); Duhon v. Conoco, Inc., 795
F. Supp. 189, 191 (W.D. La. 1992); Kelly v. Shell Oil, No. Civ. A. 91-1578, 1992 WL 162227 (E.D.
La. Jan. 23, 1992); Hird v. Resource Drilling, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D. La. 1981); Rowe v.
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 226, 228 (La. 1985); Benson v. Seagraves, 436 So. 2d 525,
528-29 (La. 1983); Thompson v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 411 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1982); Duvalle
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b. the principal did not customarily contract with outside concerns to
perform the type and magnitude of the work involved, given its own
capability to do the work 3 3 and
c. the practice of the industry was not to employ independent contractors to perform the type of work being performed by the independent
contractor on the accident date.34
In other words, a pre-Berry analysis of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061
required a look at multiple factors, including the specialization of the contract
work and an assessment of the specific work being performed by the plaintiff on
the date of the accident. 5
The state and federal courts applied this multi-factored approach under the
old "integral part" test for at least three decades before Berry.36 Indeed, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the "essential to
business" test to be a factor, but such "test is no longer, if it ever was, the

v. Lake Kenilworth, Inc., 396 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (La. 1981). A principal's conclusory assertion that
work is within its business must be scrutinized carefully, particularly where the principal's employees
never perform the work. Thompson, 411 So. 2d at 29.
33. LeBlanc v. Goldking Production Co., 706 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1983); Williams, 677 F.2d
at 509; Lewis v. Exxon Corp., 441 So. 2d 192, 197 (La. 1983); Duvalle, 396 So. 2d at 1269;
Fountain v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 578 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 581
So. 2d 707 (1991).
34. LeBlanc, 706 F.2d at 151; Williams, 677 F.2d at 510; Freeman, 517 F.2d 201. For instance,
one pre-Berry court summarizing various factors in rejecting the defendant's purported statutory
employer proof held that:
the term "routine maintenance" is conclusory in nature rather than supported by the
facts .... The documentation supporting the motion does not disclose sufficient facts
upon which a determination can be made that maintenance work of this magnitude was
customarily performed by Kerr-McGee employees- so as to be considered routine
maintenance or part of an ongoing maintenance program. Additionally, there are no facts
to show that industry practice is to perform this specific job with the company's own
employees. Furthermore, the documentation does not sufficiently explore the extent of
the use of contract labor or the relationship of the contract labor with Kerr-McGee.
Seamster v. Kerr-McGee Refinery Corp., 488 So. 2d 1139, 1142-43 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
35. See, e.g., Rowe, 471 So. 2d at 228 (plaintiff's work not determinative). The court's emphasis
on evaluating the contract work, and not looking solely at the plaintiff's work, stemmed from
language in Lewis where the supreme court extended protection beyond workmen's compensation to
the worker because the plaintiff's specific task was not within the principal's trade, business, or
occupation. Lewis, 441 So. 2d at 199.
36. See, e.g., Williams, 677 F.2d at 509 (all mentioned factors required under integral part test);
Freeman, 517 F.2d at 206-09 (exploring development of usual or customary practices test throughout
the 1960s and 70s); Stansbury v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 91 So. 2d 917, 919 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957) (factors such as "workmen of similar nature," practice in industry, whether principal regularly
employed like workers); Moak v. Link-Belt Co., 229 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969)
(contracting out work and employer's ability to do work are factors); Hird, 514 F. Supp. at 116
(proof of work being done customarily by principal's employees required undr integral part test).
See also supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

controlling factor in the identification of a statutory employer."37 The Fifth
Circuit went on in a subsequent case: "Indeed, the proper test for application of
La. R.S. 23:1061 is 'whether the activity done by the injured employee or his
actual immediate employer is part of the usual or customary practice of the
principal or others in the same operational business."''
The pre-Berry jurisprudence, therefore, required the courts to ask several
questions when evaluating what work is part of the defendant's trade, business,
or occupation, including:
(1) What is the business of the alleged principal?
(2) Do those in like businesses accomplish the work with their own
employees, or do they consistently engage others with special skills or
equipment to do the work?
(3) Has the alleged principal ever engaged in such an activity?
(4) Does the alleged principal have the manpower or expertise
necessary to undertake such work?
(5) Does the alleged principal have an established practice of contracting out all such work?39
In 1989, when the legislature rejected Berry, it failed to adopt any specific
test. The proper judicial reaction to such omission is that no new test was
intended and, therefore, the courts were to return to the pre-Berry multi-factored
approach developed over several decades. Unfortunately, the uniform response
of the federal courts was to skip back in time to the 1950s, ignoring countless
decisions between Thibodeaux v. Sun Oil Co.44 and Berry.
V. THE COURTS' REACTION TO THE

1989

AMENDMENT

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, when deciding the
retroactive or nonretroactive effect of the 1989 amendment, 41 stated the most
commonly quoted language concerning the 1989 amendment:
The 1989 amendment to 1061 significantly changes the definition of the
statutory employment relationship. It reverses years of limited judicial
applications of the statutory employer defense and returns Louisiana to

37. Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Serv., Inc., 613 F.2d 65, 71 (5th Cir. 1980). See also
Freeman,517 F.2d at 207-09; Cole v.,
Chevron Chem. Co., 477 F.2d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. Ortego v. Union Oil Co., 667 F.2d 1241, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Blanchard, 613 F.2d
at 71).
39. Malone & Johnson, supra note 13, § 364, at 33.
40. 49 So. 2d 852 (La. 1950).
41. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the amendment was not to be given retroactive effect.
Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1991). Earlier federal court decisions were contrary.
See Sawyer v. Texaco Refining, Civ. A. No. 89-2734, 1991 WL 28986 (E.D. La. 1991), vacated,963
F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion); Brock v. Chevron Chemical Co., 750 F. Supp. 779
(E.D. La. 1990), vacated, 946 F.2d 1544 (5th Cir. 1991).
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more expansive integral relation test. As a result, the right of an
employee of a subcontractor to sue a principal in tort for a work-related
injury is dramatically curtailed by the statutory employer defense.4 2
The Fifth Circuit's adoption of the integral relation test was directly contrary to
several of its earlier opinions abandoning "integral relation" for the "usual and
customary practices" test.43
Since then, the federal district courts have adopted the integral relation test,
also known as the "essential part of business" test, when adjudicating statutory
employer motions." Principals always prevail under the federal courts' postamendment analysis.4 5 There appears to be no case to date where the injured
employee could prevail.
Rather, a principal appears to be able to escape all liability by asserting the
work had to be "essential" or "integral" to his business or the contractor and his
injured employee would not have been on the principal's premises in the first
place.46 This approach reverses decades of Louisiana jurisprudence by writing
the fact-sensitive analysis out of the test and rendering the court's conclusion for
injured contractor's employees purely a legal one. Such an approach guarantees
that the principal will never have the responsibility to assure the safety of those
on its premises, creating an absolute legal immunity or per se presumption that
was not the intention of the legislature.
The leading federal case construing the 1989 amendment is the Fifth
Circuit's Salsbury decision.47 Salsbury held that the amendment's language
prohibits consideration of any of the Berry factors.48 In doing so, the court
rewrites the amendment's language from "shall not prevent the work ... from
being considered part of the principal's trade" to shall not "defeat statutory
employer status. '49 If the legislature had intended that all the Berry factors not
be used in the determination of the principal's status, then it could have written
such an absolute prohibition into the statute and said the test henceforth is the

42. Pierce, 939 F.2d at 1309.
43. See supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text.
44. Thompson v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 993 F.2d 1166, 1168 (5th Cir. 1993); Becker v. Chevron
Chemical Co., 983 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1993); Salsbury v. Hood Indus., Inc., 982 F.2d 912, 916 (5th
Cir. 1993.); Harris v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A., Inc., 980 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1992); Duhon v. Conoco,
Inc., 795 F. Supp. 189, 191 (W.D. La. 1992); Savant v. James River Paper Co., 780 F. Supp. 393,
397 (M.D. La. 1992); Campbell v. Texaco, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-477, 1992 WL 266021 (E.D. La.
1992) (unpublished opinion); Kelly v. Shell Oil, Civ. A. No. 91-1578, 1992 WL 162227 (E.D. La.
Jan. 23, 1992) (unpublished opinion); Maddox v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 419, 422 (E.D.
La. 1992).
45. The principal prevailed on its motion in all the decisions cited in supra note 44.
46. Historically, this "essential" test led to bizarre results. See, e.g., Foster v. Western Elec. Co.,
258 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972) (operating cafeteria was "essential" to large industrial plant).
47. Salsbury, 982 F.2d 912.
48. Id. at 916.
49. Id.
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integral relation test. It did not. Rather, the amendment is written disjunctively
because no single factor shall prevent or determine the court's consideration that
the work may be part of the principal's trade.
Even more disturbing is the Fifth Circuit's failure to distinguish its earlier
decisions that set forth the "proper" test for statutory employment as a customary
and usual practices testi 0 Instead, the court cited its 1969 decision of Arnold
v. Shell Oil,5 which set forth the essential to business test, but held that the fact
that an employer (or the industry as a whole) always contracts out the work was
"not controlling '52 in the analysis. The problem is that Arnold does not
support, but in fact contradicts, the Salsbury holding. Although Arnold says the
contracting out factor is not controlling, this factor, among others, was still a
consideration under the essential to business test as far back as the 1950s for
determining statutory employer status. 3 Without such factors, the essential to
business test had no criteria for determining what work is a part of the
principal's business within the meaning of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061.
Accordingly, the Salsburycourt's reliance on Arnold to strike down factors used
over three decades in adjudicating statutory employer status was misplaced.
Unlike the activity in the federal courts, there are fewer state court decisions
interpreting the 1989 amendment because time has not permitted many cases to
be fully adjudicated at the appellate level. Those appellate courts addressing the
1989 amendment have focused their inquiry on the amendment's nonretroactive
effect, not the issue of what constitutes an appropriate post-amendment
analysis. 54 Only one state appellate court has issued a reported opinion
expressly applying an integral relation test. That opinion included a thoughtprovoking dissent that offered a singly determinative analysis to the 1989
amendments. 55 No other reported decision has directly addressed the effect of

50. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text for citation to earlier Fifth Circuit decisions.
51. 419 F.2d 43, 50 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. Salisbury, 982 F.2d at 917.
53. See, e.g., Stansbury v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 91 So. 2d 917, 919 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957)
(In applying the essential to business test, this court looked to factors such as: "workmen of similar
nature," practice in the industry, whether principal regularly employed workers doing that type of
work, i.e., welders.). See also supra note 36.
54. The Louisiana Supreme Court decided to pass on the issue of whether the 1989 amendment
was to be applied retroactively before the effective date of January 1, 1990, in Bowens v. General
Motors Corp., 608 So. 2d 999, 1001 n.4 (La. 1992). The appellate courts addressing the issue have
uniformly held the amendment is not retroactive. Young v. Lyons Petroleum, Inc., 598 So. 2d 702
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 605 So. 2d 1149 (1992); Carter v. Chevron Chem. Co., 593 So. 2d
942 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 596 So. 2d 211 (1992); Frith v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
613 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 617 So. 2d 932 (1992); Bourgeois v. Puerto Rican
Marine Management, Inc., 589 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 1299,
1300 (1992); Fountain v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 578 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
581 So. 2d 707 (1991).
55. Moore v. Crystal Oil Co.. 626 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), rev'd and remanded
without opinion, 93-C-3103 (La. 1994). See also Deal v. International Paper Co., No. 25,549-CA,
1994 WL 51730 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994) (unpublished following Moore, 626 So. 2d 792); Hanks v
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the 1989 amendment with respect to the statute's original inquiry: What work
is part of the defendant's trade, business, or occupation?
VI. WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

The issue now before many state appellate courts is whether the state courts
will follow the federal courts lead or follow the earlier pre-Berry opinions. 6
The debate here does not concern the existence of completely different tests (i.e.,
integral part versus a factor analysis) because the jurisprudence, as discussed
above, essentially examined the same factors regardless of the test's label. The
problem is that many federal court decisions recently adopting the integral part
test ignore the importance of the pre-Berry decisions defining the criteria as to
what facts showed work was "a part of" the principal's business. A few
decisions have summarily mentioned some of the pre-Berry factors, 7 but many
of the decisions were summarily rendered because the plaintiff failed to oppose
the principal's motion." The failure to offer competent evidence in opposition
to the principal's motions reinforced the liberal granting of statutory employer
motions with no efforts whatsoever to conduct a fact-based inquiry based on the

post-Thibodeauxcriteria.
Given the deficiencies and lack of criteria exemplified by the federal court
decisions, it would be best for the state courts to read the statute as written. That

is, immunity results when the work being performed is "a part" of the trade,

Shell Oil Co., No. 93-CA-737 (La. App. 5th Cir. Jan. 25, 1994) (unpublished) (citing dicta in Carter,
593 So. 2d at 945-46); Frith, 613 So. 2d at 251; and Hutchins v. Hill Petroleum Co., 609 So. 2d 315
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), none of which decided the effect of the amendment. Rather, the primary
focus of discussion in these cases was the retroactive or prospective scope of the amendment. These
three cases concerned pre-amendment accidents and do not clarify the law since the amendment.
Numerous writs are pending in other appellate courts. See, e.g., supra note 19.
56. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
57. Duhon v. Conoco, 795 F. Supp. 189, 192 (W.D. La. 1992); Kelly v. Shell Oil, No. Civ. A.
91-1578, 1992 WL 162227 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1992). For instance, in Kelly, the Eastern District
applied an "essential" test, but recognized the following pre-Berry factors before granting the alleged
principal's motion for immunity: (1) Plaintiff made "no showing that he needed any special license
or other training to perform the duties required of him." Id. at *4 n.3. (2) Plaintiff admits "he
performed other maintenance duties for [his employer] during his employment." Id. And, (3)
plaintiff's "deposition testimony further indicates that Shell employed maintenance workers, including
boilermakers, who worked side-by-side with the [contractor's] employees." Id.
58. The absence of a factual examination is understandable in those cases where the plaintiff
failed to offer competent evidence in opposition to the motion. See, e.g., Maddox v. Baker Oil Tools,
Inc., 774 F. Supp. 419,422 (E.D. La. 1991); Campbell v. Texaco, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-477, 1992 WL
266021 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 1992); Savant v. James River Paper Co., 780 F. Supp. 393, 397 (M.D.
La. 1992). The Maddox court specifically said "because Maddox does not dispute the essential nature
of the contract work with affidavit or other competent evidence from which the Court could conclude
otherwise, the Court finds on this record that the work performed by Maddox was essential, and
consequently part of Exxon's 'trade, business or occupation."' Maddox, 774 F. Supp. at 422. Thus,
these courts could accept the defendants' unopposed affidavits as fact and rubberstamp the work as
essential.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

business, or occupation of the principal, rather than accepting the jurisprudence
adding that the work must be an "integral" part.5 9 In contrast to the federal
courts, the state courts should spend less time looking at the forty-three year old
decision unnecessarily adding the word "integral" to the test,' and more time
at all the post-Thibodeaux decisions defining the test's criteria as to what facts
are indicative of statutory employment. Only upon a thorough examination of
the pre-Berryjurisprudence will the realization follow that a fact based analysis
has and always shall guide the inquiry. Nevertheless, the uncertainty will
continue until there has been a ruling on the test from Louisiana's highest court.
VII. CONCLUSION

Considering the above, a test consistent with the present language of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061 and the pre-Berry jurisprudence would be an
approach examining such facts as:
(1) What is the business of the alleged principal?
(2) Is the alleged principal engaging in the work in question?
(3) Does the alleged principal have the capability (e.g., manpower,
equipment, and expertise) necessary to undertake such work?
(4) Does the alleged principal customarily contract out the work?
(5) Is the practice in the industry to accomplish the work with your
own employees or to consistently contract out the work to contractors
maintaining special skills or equipment?
(6) Is the work extraordinary or routine?
(7) Was the plaintiff engaging in the work on the date of the accident?
Such an approach provides definite criteria, while returning courts to the factual
inquiry that the statute has always necessitated. In reality, it is likely the state
and federal courts will continue to go two different directions until, once again,
the supreme court tidies up the mess left by the 1989 amendment.

59. Malone & Johnson, supra note 13, § 364, at 151 (commenting on the jurisprudential addition
of an extra word, "integral," to the test).
60. Id. at 147 n.46 (discussing unnecessary gloss of 'the word "integral" added by Thibodeaux
decision).

